Welcome to the sixth edition of Political Insider, our fortnightly newsletter on Myanmar politics. Apologies for the silence in recent weeks – we took a break for the Thingyan national holiday in mid-April, but we're now back up and running.
In our last edition we looked at an important component of the opposition movement: the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. Since then the CRPH has formed the National Unity Government, and leaders have begun to more frequently and openly discussing plans for armed struggle and cooperation with ethnic armed groups.
Today's edition drills down into this topic, examining NUG policy on a federal army, the establishment of local defence forces in response to Tatmadaw crackdowns, and recent reports about ethnic armed groups providing training to protesters. We also look at what this could mean for the trajectory of the anti-coup movement in the months and years ahead.
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The fight-back: Is Myanmar on the road to all-out war?
In the 90 days since Tatmadaw leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing snatched power in a coup d’etat, Myanmar has endured a level of bloodshed and instability not seen outside of border areas since 1988.
More than 750 people have been killed, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, and almost 3,500 arrested, including many prominent politicians and protest leaders. Fighting is intensifying in Kachin and Kayin states, and civilians are fighting back in Sagaing Region and Chin State, among other places.
But could a new dynamic soon ratchet up the violence even further?
When the military overthrew Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected government, just before it was about to embark on a second term following its landslide election win, millions of people took to the streets to peacefully demand an end to military rule and the release of detainees.
At first the military’s response was restrained, but brutal crackdowns starting in late February convinced many people that only an armed response could dislodge the Tatmadaw. Initially, many hoped that foreign forces, possibly invoking the principle of Responsibility to Protect, or R2P, would arrive in Myanmar and detain Tatmadaw leaders for crimes against humanity. This was never realistic, and it quickly became clear to people within Myanmar that it wasn’t going to happen.
Instead, they pinned their hopes on a “federal army”, believing that ethnic armed groups could join forces with the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and fight their common enemy. This idea is not new – it has been floated in peace discussions over the past decade – and while it sounds attractive in theory, it would be fiendishly difficult in practice.
Nevertheless, the CRPH, sensing the public mood, soon began to talk regularly about setting up a federal army. Some ethnic armed groups though have not shown much enthusiasm at the idea of working with the CRPH, reflecting not only longstanding grievances towards Bamar political leaders and the Myanmar state, but also mistrust of the NLD specifically. Meanwhile, the Tatmadaw is actively negotiating with its most formidable battlefield opponent in recent years, the Arakan Army, which has refused to condemn the coup. As with foreign intervention, it didn’t take long for people to realise that a federal army wasn’t going to be the quick fix they’d hoped for.
With no answer in sight, reports began emerging on social media in late February and early March that young people were travelling to areas under the control of ethnic armed groups to undergo military training so they could take the fight to the Tatmadaw. Seemingly confirming this trend, around the same time military-owned Myawady News was reporting frequently on security forces arresting youths in Mon and Kayin states while they were apparently trying to reach ethnic armed group territory.
However, there was relatively little reliable information – no reports in local or international media – so all people had to go on was hearsay and social media. Many were either not aware that this training was taking place at all, or did not believe what they read online or heard from friends.
The lack of information was in part because communication in ethnic armed group areas is difficult, but also because the groups themselves have been reluctant to disclose the support they are providing. Normally photos and other evidence would leak online, but there is also a widespread belief that it is better to keep the information secret, both so the Tatmadaw is not aware and to protect the relatives of those participating.
That changed in the past week, when both Reuters and VOA reported on protesters undergoing armed training in border areas. Now it’s one of the hottest topics on social media – the top Burmese-language Facebook post in Frontier’s Media Monitor on Friday, with more than 80,000 interactions, was an interview with young Gen Z member who had participated in training in an ethnic armed group area.
This week, a senior Karen National Union official confirmed to Frontier that protesters and activists from the cities, particularly Yangon and Mandalay, have turned to the KNU and its armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army, for military training. The group is teaching them about explosives, small arms and combat tactics.
For security reasons, Padoh Saw Taw Nee, who heads the KNU’s Foreign Affairs Department, would not share the locations of the trainings, or the total number of people who are participating. Media reports suggest it is in the hundreds, possibly the high hundreds. But he did disclose that most travelled to KNU territory through Mon State’s Thaton Township, under the KNLA’s 1st Brigade, and Hpapun Township in Kayin State, under the 5th Brigade.
In normal circumstances, the KNU trains its cadets for three years, and even short courses take at least six months. But Saw Taw Nee said the group had agreed to provide shorter trainings for the recent arrivals as an “exception”.
“The newcomers are eager to learn and want to learn fast – they think our regular training is too time-consuming. They demanded that we provide short-term training so they can shoot competently at security forces,” he told Frontier in a Zoom call on April 25.
“The KNU does not encourage violence but they have the right to self-defence,” he said. Whether they use that training exclusively for self-defence is another matter. “We can’t stop enthusiastic young people from doing what they want to do.”
On April 14, Frontier spoke to a 29-year-old man from Yangon who was with the KNU’s 1st Brigade and about to start his training elsewhere in KNU territory.
He had participated in peaceful protests since shortly after the coup and later witnessed unarmed protesters getting shot on the street. His desire for revenge intensified after two of his relatives were arrested in March and harshly interrogated in Yangon’s Insein Prison. After discussing the situation with his wife, he decided to join the armed struggle. He contacted friends who had started military training in March, and made his way to Mon State.
He did not seem to have given much thought to the specifics of armed revolution, but his motive was simple: “If we attend this training, we will be able to take up arms to fight back against the military that is oppressing the people,” he said.
Saw Taw Nee said many of those being trained had a similar story. “Most of them do not want to be violent, but these young people changed their minds when civilians living in the cities were brutally suppressed. When they are being abused, killed and oppressed by the military junta, young people are tempted to retaliate. That’s why many came to our side,” he said.
Saw Taw Nee said the KNU decided to shelter and offer training to the young anti-military activists in part because it was an opportunity to change mainstream Bamar perceptions of ethnic armed groups – which tend to equate them with illicit money-making and thuggery – as well as to build alliances with new political and military forces in the country.
He said most people in Myanmar have had little understanding of the decades-long plight of ethnic minorities, but the violent campaigns in the cities have helped to change attitudes.
“What young people are facing in the cities now is the same as what the Tatmadaw has been doing in ethnic areas for many years,” he said. “I’m very happy that we can support them.”
Frontier understands that several other armed groups are also training “Gen Z” protesters, but so far these groups have refused to confirm this publicly. Sources indicate that some have already completed their training in border areas and returned to the country's central regions, where they are expected to stage attacks on security forces.
In addition to these newly trained insurgents, some ethnic armed groups have also seen a surge in new recruits into their own ranks. In northern Myanmar, for example, the Kachin Independence Army has been receiving “dozens” of new recruits every day in the wake of military crackdowns against protesters. Both the KNLA and KIA have also taken advantage of the Tatmadaw’s preoccupation with crushing urban protests by seizing strategic bases that it had lost to the Tatmadaw in previous bouts of fighting. This has prompted Tatmadaw reprisals in the form of air strikes, but ethnic armed groups reportedly continue to gain ground.
In rural areas, some people are also forming local self-defense forces independent of existing armed groups. “National guard forces” have been raised in Chin and Mon states, and youth in Ayeyarwady Region have also established an “Ayeyarwady Federal Army”.
In some cases, they have managed to launch deadly surprise attacks on police and soldiers. On April 25, the Chinland Defence Force launched an attack on junta forces in Matupi Township that reportedly left up to 15 Tatmadaw soldiers dead.
Many of these forces have aligned themselves with the parallel National Unity Government and ethnic armed groups, expressed support for a federal army, and vowed to fight together until democracy is restored. In practice, though, there has been little communication or cooperation between the guard forces and the NUG or ethnic armed groups, in part due to the nationwide mobile internet shutdown.
Similarly, Saw Taw Nee said it was not yet clear what would happen when the cadets from Yangon, Mandalay and other areas finished their training in the jungles of Karen State.
A general plan seems to be emerging, however, for at least some of them to join a People’s Defence Army under the National Unity Government. Saw Taw Nee said the KNU was discussing this with the NUG, which was formed by the CRPH in mid-April as Myanmar’s legitimate interim administration pending the writing of a new federal constitution.
On April 16, the NUG’s defence minister, Yee Mon, said that because the federal army will take time to establish, in the meantime the NUG would establish the PDA and had been holding many discussions with ethnic armed groups about how it might work. “It will appear shortly,” Yee Mon said, but declined to provide further details.
A week later, he told the BBC the NUG is going to recruit young people from across the country into the PDA, and also integrate ward and village-based public security groups. These groups were formed in some areas under an “interim public administration” plan announced by the CRPH in late February, but in most cases quickly crumbled due to brutal reprisals from the security forces (for more on the CRPH’s failed attempt to initiate parallel local governments, see the section titled “trouble at the grassroots” in the previous edition of Political Insider).
Asked what military strategy the PDA would pursue, Yee Mon said it would be mixed. They plan to train troops for urban guerrilla warfare, while also establishing a battalion of regular soldiers, he said. “We are also in contact with [local] self-defence organisations and in the future we will provide them with professional training,” he said.
Not everyone is convinced that armed struggle is the right way forward. The National League for Democracy has in the past stuck firmly to non-violence, and some believe this is still the most effective strategy for the NUG.
“Non-violence is the most appropriate strategy for the pro-democracy movement,” said one Myanmar political analyst, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “I think it's best to open dialogue quickly [between the Tatmadaw and NLD] and talk about what should happen so the situation doesn’t get any worse.”
Regardless of whether armed struggle is the most effective strategy, it seems to be the one that anti-military forces are increasingly taking. This is understandable given the military’s clear unwillingness, since day one of the coup, to consider negotiations with the people’s elected representatives. In effect, the Tatmadaw is encouraging armed resistance through its brutality and refusal to seek an "off ramp" through negotiations. But although a brokered solution to Myanmar’s crisis is currently hard to foresee, armed resistance is going to make it an even more remote prospect.
Nevertheless, the youth being trained for battle seem to be under few illusions about the level of sacrifice war will require, and consider the alternative – a future lived under a military that crushes all peaceful opposition – to be a far bleaker proposition. This commitment to risk everything commands respect, but we should be prepared for a descent into ever-greater violence and a humanitarian crisis that will test the world’s ability, and willingness, to respond.
Frontier Myanmar is an award-winning independent magazine based in Yangon. Visit our website here.
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