S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002890
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, S/CT
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2026
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, TH, Southern Thailand
SUBJECT: A LONG-TERM THAI EFFORT TO DEAL WITH SOUTHERN
VIOLENCE
REF: A. BANGKOK 2338 (WAY AHEAD IN SOUTHERN THAILAND)
B. BANGKOK 2337 (CURRENT U.S. ASSISTANCE/PROGRAMS)
C. BANGKOK 2330 (LIFTING BAN ON PROVINCIAL POLICE)
D. BANGKOK 926 (U.S.-THAI MILITARY COOPERATION)
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a, d)
1. (S) SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION: As we continue to develop a
framework to assist the Thai deal with the situation in far
southern Thailand, we should be realistic about the
limitations of our aid and the length of time it will take
for the Thai to make significant progress in the South.
Expanded training of military and police/prosecutors
(including provincial police) offers us the most expeditious
path towards helping the Thai address immediate security
shortcomings. Reconciliation efforts, including sensible
recommendations that come from the National Reconciliation
Commission (NRC), also deserve our attention. However, given
the historical realities of the conflict, built-in
limitations of Thai security forces, and constraints on our
direct involvement, we can only expect incremental
improvements in the situation. Currently, the violence in
the South remains localized, directed towards Thai targets
and driven by deep-seated grievances of ethnic Malays against
the central government. Attacks are not directed against
Americans or the West and there are no clear links to
transnational terrorists. Targeted U.S. assistance can help
give the Thai the tools they need to get better control of
the troubled provinces security, but it will take years of
enlightened Thai government policy, better intelligence, and
luck, frankly, to finally quell the insurgency. END
SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION
FOCUSING ON WHAT WE CAN CHANGE
------------------------------
2. (S) Our current assistance programs (reftels B, D) and
requests for expanded assistance (reftels A) focus on
security assistance -- particularly the continued
professionalization of the military and police and prosecutor
training. We have developed proposals for a range of
training and assistance programs that are aimed at improving
RTG performance and coordination in the South. This focus
will require the participation of all Thai security agencies,
and will require us to relax our absolute ban on training the
provincial police (reftel C), while maintaining a strict
human rights vetting regime. An immediate focus on expanded
training -- which fosters inter-service cooperation -- with
security forces and prosecutors offers us the most
expeditious path towards helping the Thais get a handle on
the security situation in the near-term. Because this type
of assistance builds on our existing programs and
relationships with professional working level officials, it
avoids aggravating a delicate political situation by raising
the U.S. profile too high.
SUPPORTING SENSIBLE LONG-TERM RECONCILIATION
--------------------------------------------
3. (C) The long-awaited report by the National
Reconciliation Commission (NRC), dedicated to addressing root
causes of the conflict, is currently on hold until a stable
government is established. When the political situation
stabilizes enough for the NRC to step forward and present its
findings, we should weigh in vigorously to support practical
recommendations presented by the Commission. The Thai will
eventually have to address some of the legitimate grievances
detailed in the report that are root causes of the alienation
of the local populace. This will require the RTG to make
some tough, and probably unpopular, choices on how it governs
the South and to examine what it means to be "Thai."
Implementation of the recommendations -- unlikely to have an
immediate impact on the violence -- will require patience
from both the RTG and the U.S. A Thai military officer
involved in southern security issues told us that the Army
was preparing political leaders to face a decade of effort to
"fix" the South. Some notable conciliatory changes are
already being implemented. On May 5, caretaker Education
Minister Chaturon Chaisaeng announced that some public
schools in the three southernmost provinces would start using
a bilingual Malay/Thai curriculum.
------------------------------------
BEING REALISTIC ABOUT OUR ASSISTANCE
------------------------------------
4. (C) It is vital that we work to improve the performance
of Thai security forces and support sensible reconciliation
efforts, but we also need to be realistic about the
limitations of our involvement:
-- History of Violence: We should be prepared to see a high
level of violence continue in the South regardless of our
actions. The Malay-Muslims of greater Pattani were
incorporated in the Thai state 100 years ago against their
will. They are proud of their unique history, language,
culture, and religion. In the future, a certain level of
violence will continue as some ethnic Malays continue to
resist the imposition of control and culture from Bangkok.
Moreover, this border region has always been one of the most
violent parts of Thailand due to criminal activities which
are often reported as "insurgent-related" by police and the
media.
-- We Can't Change Everything: We should be aggressive in our
implementation of assistance to address the serious
deficiencies of Thai security forces, especially stove-piping
and abilities of some prosecutors and police. We can work on
these problems. However, there are deeper, ingrained
shortcomings within the security forces that will be harder
to address, including a lack of respect for ethnic Malays
that borders on outright racism and institutionalized
rivalries between police and the military. Our modestly
expanded aid will help overall, but it will not solve these
problems.
-- Expect Incremental Improvements: Though the Thai have
their problems, we should acknowledge the relative
professional standard of RTG security agencies, especially
when compared with neighboring countries. Many Thai
officials are well aware of the deep and complicated nature
of the situation and have been working to overcome
traditional failings despite being hampered by poor policy
choices from political leaders. We can expect incremental
rather than exponential improvements from increased U.S.
assistance.
-- Anti-U.S. Rumors Remain a Serious Concern: Rumors that we
are somehow fomenting the violence as part of our war on
terror, or as a pretext to establish a military base,
continue to be widely believed in the South. To avoid
feeding these rumors -- and consequently redirecting anger
towards us or possibly attracting international jihadists --
we must scrupulously avoid a U.S. presence in the South and
whenever possible not label our security assistance as
related to the conflict. This reality will necessarily have
some degree of impact on the effectiveness of our assistance.
The southern Philippines model will not work here (not
withstanding the fact that the situation in southern Thailand
is not analogous to the Philippines).
CONTAINING THE PROBLEM
----------------------
5. (S) Without downplaying the seriousness of the
situation, it is important to remember that the RTG is not
losing its grip on power in the South. The shadowy militants
do not offer the population an alternative to the Thai
government and do not appear to enjoy widespread support
among southerners. Despite dire predictions, the violence to
date remains contained and isolated to the geographic far
South. The best evidence -- and we check this constantly --
is that transnational terrorists are not directly involved in
the South. Most importantly, violence and anger in the South
is not directed against the U.S. and, rumors aside, we are
not seen as a central part of this problem. As we consider
our approach and offers of additional assistance, it is
imperative that we pay careful attention to managing both the
form and content of U.S. assistance programs. Sustained,
low-key, long-term support is the key to doing our part in
assisting the Thai government to better manage the difficult
southern provinces.
BOYCE